The SOE Premium and Government Support in China's Credit Market

Jun Pan

Shanghai Advanced Institute of Finance
Shanghai Jiao Tong University

October 28, 2020

Joint work with Zhe Geng from SAIF

Motivation

- China's credit misallocation with respect to state-owned enterprises (SOE):
  - Anecdotally, SOEs in China are known to have preferential access to bank loans.
  - Limited empirical evidence on the actual magnitudes, especially in loan pricing.
  - Varies with economic conditions and government policies (Lardy (2019)).
  - Allocational inefficiency drags on aggregate growth (Hsieh and Klenow (2009)).
- We focus on the tension between SOEs and non-SOEs in the credit market:
  - To what extent is the perceived government support priced in?
  - Can its presence shut out non-SOEs and cause severe segmentation in pricing?
  - How does price discovery take place under the segmentation?
  - What is the real impact on non-SOE firms in China?

Our Findings

- From 2010-2020, we find a market of improved price efficiency:
  - Post 2014Q1, credit quality becomes important in credit pricing.
  - Post 2018Q2, government support becomes important in credit pricing.
- Paradoxically, price efficiency deepens allocational inefficiency:
  - Post 2018Q2, the SOE premium exploded from 20 bps to well over 100 bps.
  - Driver of this explosion: emergence of government support in credit pricing above and beyond the SOE label.
- The real impact of the allocational inefficiency:
  - Post 2018Q2, non-SOEs have lost their advantage in profitability and fundamental strength over SOEs.
- Price discovery under the severe SOE-NSOE segmentation:
  - Non-SOE credit spreads become more informative of credit quality.
  - SOE credit spreads become more sensitive to the extent of government support.

Our Contributions to the Literature

- The macro literature on credit misallocations and their impact on China's growth:
  - ▸ Brandt and Zhu (2000), Dollar and Wei (2007), Hsieh and Klenow (2009), Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2011), Lardy (2019), Cong, Gao, Ponticelli, and Yang (2019), and Huang, Pagano, and Panizza (2020).
  - ▸ **Our paper:** Use credit market to uncover the opaque credit allocation, and document the severe segmentation in pricing post 2018Q2 and its real impact.

- The asset-pricing literature studying the information content of credit spreads:
  - ▸ Evidence from the US: Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001), Campbell and Taksler (2003), Bao (2009), Bao, Pan, and Wang (2011), and others.
  - ▸ **Our paper:** The information content of credit spreads in China.

- Government support and credit spreads:
  - ▸ Berndt, Duffie, and Zhu (2019): Bailout probability and banks' credit spreads.
  - ▸ **Our paper:** Government support and credit spreads in China.

Growing Literature on China's Credit Market

- Overview: Hu, Pan and Wang (2019) and Amstad and He (2019).
- Government guarantee in
  - SOE bonds: Jin, Wang and Zhang (2018).
  - Chengtou Bonds: Bai and Zhou (2018) and Liu, Lyu and Fu (2017).
- Other topics:
  - Wang, Wei, and Zhong (2015) on yield-chasing retail investors.
  - Mo and Subrahmanyam (2019) on liquidity.
  - Chen, Chen, He, Liu and Xie (2019) on pledgeability.
  - Chen, He, and Liu (2020) on the growth of Chengtou bonds.
  - Ding, Xiong, and Zhang (2020) on issuance overpricing.
  - Gao, Huang, and Mo (2020) on credit enhancement.
  - Huang, Liu, and Shi (2020) on the determinants of short-term credit spreads.

China's Onshore Credit Market for Non-Financial Firms

- RMB 24 trillion, second only to the US.
- Global share: 3% in 2008; 25% in 2019.
- Past three decades:

  rapid growth of China's economy.
- Coming decades:

  global integration of China's markets.

Debt Financing Channels in China

- **Credit market:** transparent, driven exclusively by concerns over credit risk.
- **Bank loans:** opaque, relational, and clouded by other factors.
- **Shadow banking:** even more opaque.

Relevance of our paper: Absent of pricing data on bank loans and shadow banking, our paper uncovers the otherwise opaque credit allocation in China.

Summary Statistics: Bond-Level Data

	Non-SOE Listed			SOE Listed			Non-SOE Unlisted			SOE Unlisted		
	mean	med	std	mean	med	std	mean	med	std	mean	med	std
NumIssuers	367			403			403			1,795		
NumBonds	923			1,477			1,518			7,061		
CreditSpread (%)	2.47	1.94	2.39	1.39	0.99	1.41	2.82	2.48	1.85	1.58	1.31	1.18
Rating	2.43	3.00	0.85	1.69	1.00	0.84	2.33	2.00	0.81	1.98	2.00	0.86
Maturity (yr)	2.97	2.79	1.25	3.33	2.95	1.70	3.11	2.81	1.47	3.59	3.23	1.86
IssueSize (billion)	1.03	0.80	0.89	2.00	1.20	2.56	1.09	1.00	0.92	1.67	1.00	2.18
Age (yr)	1.75	1.53	1.26	2.01	1.61	1.67	1.66	1.38	1.31	2.29	1.86	1.86
Coupon (%)	5.91	5.90	1.24	5.13	5.10	1.09	6.11	6.20	1.31	5.79	5.80	1.25
Embed	0.63	1.00	0.48	0.39	0.00	0.49	0.56	1.00	0.50	0.26	0.00	0.44
Exch	0.69	1.00	0.46	0.53	1.00	0.50	0.48	0.00	0.50	0.21	0.00	0.41
ZeroDays (%)	77	88	26	86	93	18	85	93	20	88	94	16
Turnover (%)	31	13	62	35	10	80	48	15	117	63	21	144
TradingDays (day)	15	8	18	10	5	12	10	5	13	8	4	11

Summary Statistics: Bond-Level Data by Period

| | Non-SOE Listed | | | | | | SOE Listed | | | | | |
| | Phase I | | Phase II | | Phase III | | Phase I | | Phase II | | Phase III | |
	mean	std	mean	std	mean	std	mean	std	mean	std	mean	std
NumIssuers	178		315		227		256		340		252	
NumBonds	221		643		570		458		824		884	
CreditSpread (%)	2.03	1.25	2.06	1.39	3.57	3.78	1.21	0.79	1.32	1.31	1.70	1.89
Rating	2.73	0.75	2.60	0.73	1.91	0.91	1.85	0.86	1.80	0.89	1.34	0.61
Maturity (yr)	3.89	1.38	2.94	1.16	2.42	0.94	4.16	2.01	3.22	1.55	2.76	1.31
IssueSize (billion)	0.94	0.80	1.01	0.94	1.14	0.85	2.31	3.16	1.89	2.49	1.91	2.01
Age (yr)	1.25	1.04	1.81	1.30	1.94	1.21	1.54	1.36	2.26	1.69	1.98	1.77
Coupon (%)	6.45	0.99	5.96	1.23	5.46	1.25	5.44	0.97	5.24	1.09	4.65	1.05
Embed	0.52	0.50	0.65	0.48	0.65	0.48	0.28	0.45	0.43	0.50	0.43	0.49
Exch	0.77	0.42	0.70	0.46	0.63	0.48	0.56	0.50	0.56	0.50	0.45	0.50
ZeroDays (%)	62	30	76	26	88	16	79	21	85	19	92	10
Turnover (%)	44	91	32	56	20	47	54	118	31	70	26	46
TradingDays (day)	25	20	16	18	8	11	14	14	10	13	5	6

Summary Statistics: Equity-Level Data

| | Non-SOE Listed | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | All | | | Phase I | | | Phase II | | | Phase III | | |
	mean	med	std	mean	med	std	mean	med	std	mean	med	std
# Firms	367			178			315			227		
Equity Size (log)	23.30	23.26	1.02	22.57	22.48	0.93	23.31	23.28	0.88	23.77	23.70	1.08
Leverage (%)	58.55	59.06	15.29	55.76	56.43	12.84	57.39	57.89	15.27	62.67	62.47	15.97
Asset Growth (%)	24.96	20.91	19.42	28.69	24.45	21.24	24.69	20.65	19.64	23.08	19.50	17.28
Asset Volatility (%)	22.95	19.72	15.50	22.13	21.19	10.34	26.04	21.61	17.44	17.33	14.59	12.21
Default Measure (%)	21.18	18.07	12.78	18.70	17.87	6.59	22.48	18.45	14.97	20.21	17.50	10.60
Govt Holdings (%)	5.07	2.03	8.36	4.97	1.59	8.72	4.51	1.93	7.50	6.23	2.99	9.55
Ctrl Holdings (%)	36.41	32.81	17.43	36.55	33.18	18.83	36.90	33.32	16.78	35.35	32.05	17.69
	SOE Listed											
# Firms	403			256			340			252		
Equity Size (log)	23.71	23.56	1.34	23.31	23.05	1.40	23.71	23.52	1.28	24.05	23.98	1.28
Leverage (%)	61.67	64.05	14.90	61.18	62.99	14.61	61.19	63.51	15.70	63.00	65.96	13.56
Asset Growth (%)	14.32	12.11	13.04	19.69	17.01	14.23	12.82	11.15	12.99	12.11	10.38	10.37
Asset Volatility (%)	17.18	13.31	13.83	15.07	12.89	9.54	21.41	16.69	16.24	11.46	8.51	9.07
Default Measure (%)	22.56	18.79	15.12	18.39	17.70	7.83	26.78	21.33	18.91	18.71	17.10	9.26
Govt Holdings (%)	51.93	53.86	16.76	52.08	53.85	17.34	51.22	53.60	16.71	53.08	54.65	16.26
Ctrl Holdings (%)	45.50	46.00	16.39	47.19	48.81	17.20	45.26	45.54	16.45	44.41	44.92	15.40

Measuring the SOE Premium

Quarterly panel regressions with quarter and industry fixed effects:

$$\text{CreditSpread}_{i,t} = a + \mathbf{b}\,\text{NSOE}_{i,t} + c\,\text{Rating}_{i,t} + \sum_k \text{Controls}_{i,t}^k + \epsilon_{i,t}$$

| | **Credit Spreads (%)** | | | | | |
| | Listed Firms | | | Unlisted Firms | | |
	Phase I	Phase II	Phase III	Phase I	Phase II	Phase III
NSOE	0.20***	0.21***	1.06***	0.16***	0.79***	1.54***
	[3.08]	[3.58]	[7.78]	[3.47]	[12.92]	[17.28]
Rating	0.51***	0.53***	1.24***	0.54***	0.41***	0.46***
	[6.39]	[10.96]	[4.84]	[14.11]	[16.89]	[14.58]
Observations	4,344	10,072	5,348	21,525	45,315	16,999
Adjusted R-squared	0.543	0.468	0.385	0.544	0.382	0.457

The Time-Varying SOE Premium

- 2014Q1: First default.
- 2014-2016: Credit boom.
- 2016-2017: 降杠杆 Deleveraging campaigns.
- 2018Q2: 资管新规 New Regulations on Asset Management.
- Since November 2018: Efforts to reassure the private sector.

Behind the Exploding SOE Premium

- Government-led credit tightening policies:
  - Severely weakened the demand from the asset-management industry in China.
  - Shrunk the financing and re-financing channels of corporate issuers.
- Competing explanations:
  - **Government support:** Lacking government support, non-SOEs are more vulnerable than SOEs. Akin to a run on non-SOEs, investors seek safety in SOE bonds and shun non-SOE bonds.
  - **Credit quality:** Due to over-borrowing and over-expanding, non-SOEs are weak in fundamental strength and ill prepared for the credit contraction.

Proxy for Credit Quality: Default Measure

- We use the inverse of Merton's distance to default (DD):

$$\mathrm{DM}_t = \mathrm{DD}_t^{-1} \quad \text{and} \quad \mathrm{DD}_t = \frac{\left(\mu - \frac{1}{2}\sigma_A^2\right)T - \ln\left(K/V_0\right)}{\sigma_A\sqrt{T}}$$

- Issuers with higher DM: lower credit quality and more likely to default.
- Our default measure is similar in spirit to:
  - Merton's probability of default $N(-\mathrm{DD})$: Its reliance on normal distribution predicts low levels of defaults and flattens out the cross-issuer variation in DD.
  - Moody's KMV EDF (expected default frequency): This construction of empirical distribution requires a large database of historical defaults, infeasible for the Chinese market.

Merton's Model of Default, $dV_t = \mu V_t\, dt + \sigma_A V_t\, dZ_t$

Distance-to-Default (DD):

$$\frac{\left(\mu - \frac{1}{2}\sigma_A^2\right) T - \ln(K/V_0)}{\sigma_A \sqrt{T}}$$

- Asset volatility: σ_A
- Firm leverage: K/V_0
- Asset growth: μ

In-figure labels:

$V_T = e^{X_T}$

X_T

$E(X_T) = \left(\mu - \frac{1}{2}\sigma_A^2\right) T$

$\sigma_A \sqrt{T}$

$\sigma_A \sqrt{T}$

$X_0 = 0$

Distance-to-Default $\rightarrow$

$K/V_0 = 50\%$

Default Boundary

Log of Asset Value

T=0   T=1

Model Calibration

- For a fixed horizon T, we estimate the firm's asset value V_t and volatility σ_A via

$$E_t = V_t \, N(d_1) - e^{r\,T} \, K N(d_2) \quad \text{and} \quad \sigma_E = \frac{V_t}{E_t} \frac{\partial E_t}{\partial A_t} \, \sigma_A \,,$$

  where E_t is the firm's equity value and σ_E is the equity volatility, and

$$d_2 = \frac{\ln(V_t/K) + (r - \sigma_A^2/2)\,T}{\sigma_A\sqrt{T}} \quad \text{and} \quad d_1 = d_2 + \sigma_A\sqrt{T} \,.$$

- Quarterly calibration using quarterly-updated model inputs:
  - Default Boundary K: current liabilities plus one half of long-term debt.
  - Equity Value E_t: the total market cap by quarter end.
  - Equity volatility σ_E: estimated using daily stock returns within the quarter.
  - Riskfree rate r: one-year bank deposit rate.

Difference in Default Measure, SOEs vs Non-SOEs

Difference in Default Measure

Quarterly panel regressions with quarter and industry fixed effects:

$$DM_{i,t} = a + \mathbf{b}\, NSOE_{i,t} + c\, Rating_{i,t} + \sum_k Controls_{i,t}^k + \epsilon_{i,t}$$

	DM (%)		
	Phase I	Phase II	Phase III
NSOE	-1.50***	-3.08***	-0.55
	[-2.95]	[-4.23]	[-0.91]
Rating	0.79*	-0.18	1.60***
	[1.94]	[-0.51]	[3.13]
Obs	4,344	10,072	5,350
Adj R^2	0.151	0.660	0.331

Proxies for Government Support

- **The Non-SOE Dummy:**
  - Defined by the affiliation, state or non-state, of the end-controller of the firm.
 - Government: central or local SASAC, central or local government institutions, and central or local SOEs.

- **Government Holdings:**
  - Government's equity ownership of a firm, measured at quarterly frequency.
  - Built from the ground up and has not been studied for credit pricing:
    - ★ Start with quarterly information of the top-ten shareholders of a firm.
    - ★ Merge with other datasets to identify the shareholders' affiliations.
    - ★ Further refined by using similar datasets from Wind and CSMAR.
  - A continuous measure, informative for both SOEs and non-SOEs.
  - We further use government end-controller holdings as a robust measure.

Government Holdings

Bond×Quarter Distribution

Quarterly Distribution

Explaining the SOE Premium

$$\text{CreditSpread}_{i,t} = a + \mathbf{b}\,\text{NSOE}_{i,t} + \mathbf{c}\,\text{DM}_{i,t} + \mathbf{d}\,\text{GovtHoldings}_{i,t} + e\,\text{Rating}_{i,t} + \sum_k \text{Controls}_{i,t}^k + \epsilon_{i,t}$$

	Phase I			Phase II			Phase III		
NSOE	0.20***	0.20***	0.20**	0.21***	0.25***	0.18*	1.06***	1.09***	-0.09
	[3.08]	[2.95]	[2.46]	[3.58]	[4.32]	[1.68]	[7.78]	[7.76]	[-0.48]
DM		-0.13			1.26***			4.78***	
		[-0.40]			[4.52]			[5.24]	
GovtHoldings			0.00			-0.08			-2.81***
			[0.01]			[-0.37]			[-7.82]
Rating	0.51***	0.51***	0.51***	0.53***	0.53***	0.52***	1.24***	1.16***	1.20***
	[6.39]	[6.29]	[6.23]	[10.96]	[11.23]	[11.01]	[4.84]	[4.73]	[4.66]
Obs	4,344	4,344	4,344	10,072	10,072	10,072	5,348	5,348	5,348
Adjusted R^2	0.543	0.543	0.543	0.468	0.476	0.468	0.385	0.402	0.398

Price Discovery

$$\text{CreditSpread}_{i,t} = a + \mathbf{b}\,\text{DM}_{i,t} + \mathbf{c}\,\text{GovtHoldings}_{i,t} + d\,\text{Rating}_{i,t} + \sum_k \text{Controls}_{i,t}^k + \epsilon_{i,t}$$

| NSOE	Phase I				Phase II				Phase III			
DM		-0.03 [-0.03]		-0.01 [-0.02]		1.63*** [2.88]		1.62*** [2.89]		7.89*** [3.83]		8.01*** [3.94]
GovtHoldings			0.45 [1.06]	0.45 [1.05]			0.24 [0.52]	0.12 [0.27]			-5.52*** [-4.56]	-5.69*** [-5.14]
Rating	0.74*** [2.99]	0.74*** [2.99]	0.75*** [3.05]	0.75*** [3.05]	0.41*** [4.65]	0.41*** [4.82]	0.41*** [4.77]	0.42*** [4.88]	1.64*** [4.34]	1.44*** [4.06]	1.58*** [4.24]	1.37*** [3.85]
Obs	1,372	1,372	1,372	1,372	4,182	4,182	4,182	4,182	2,095	2,095	2,095	2,095
Adj R^2	0.484	0.483	0.484	0.484	0.376	0.386	0.376	0.386	0.367	0.397	0.382	0.413
SOE	Phase I				Phase II				Phase III			
DM		0.09 [0.65]		0.08 [0.58]		1.04*** [3.84]		1.04*** [3.83]		2.09*** [2.65]		1.47* [1.87]
GovtHoldings			-0.17 [-1.26]	-0.17 [-1.25]			-0.11 [-0.52]	-0.12 [-0.57]			-2.32*** [-6.05]	-2.18*** [-6.02]
Rating	0.39*** [11.23]	0.39*** [11.20]	0.39*** [11.01]	0.38*** [10.97]	0.55*** [9.50]	0.55*** [9.83]	0.54*** [9.76]	0.55*** [10.06]	0.58*** [4.88]	0.56*** [4.72]	0.53*** [4.70]	0.52*** [4.61]
Obs	2,972	2,972	2,972	2,972	5,890	5,890	5,890	5,890	3,253	3,253	3,253	3,253
Adj R^2	0.542	0.542	0.543	0.543	0.500	0.508	0.500	0.508	0.386	0.393	0.412	0.415

Credit Spreads on Default Measure


Regression Coefficient

R-Squared Explained

Credit Spreads on Government Holdings


Regression Coefficient

R-Squared Explained

The Real Impact

- The differentiation between SOEs and non-SOEs is among the most important friction in China's economy.
- Widely documented:
  - ▶ The inefficiency of China's SOEs and their preferential access to debt financing.
  - ▶ The importance of the private sector: 60% of GDP, 70% of innovation, 80% of urban employment, and 90% of new jobs.
- How has the severe credit segmentation since 2018Q2 affected the non-SOEs?

Credit Market Conditions

Quarterly Default in Credit Market

Quarterly New Issuance of Corporate Bonds

The Real Impact of the Credit-Market Segmentation

	ROA (%)			ROE (%)			DM (%)		
	Phase I	Phase II	Phase III	Phase I	Phase II	Phase III	Phase I	Phase II	Phase III
NSOE	0.56***	0.52***	0.13	1.07***	1.20***	-0.02	-2.18***	-3.51***	-0.43
	[7.76]	[8.83]	[1.07]	[6.69]	[7.93]	[-0.05]	[-6.56]	[-4.43]	[-0.68]
EquitySize	0.18***	0.19***	0.35***	0.77***	0.74***	1.09***	-0.67***	-1.50***	-2.60***
	[6.00]	[6.33]	[8.69]	[10.81]	[11.11]	[7.60]	[-2.94]	[-4.08]	[-9.10]
Constant	-3.54***	-4.33***	-7.40***	-15.89***	-15.91***	-22.78***	32.90***	57.61***	82.19***
	[-4.85]	[-6.04]	[-9.76]	[-9.40]	[-9.52]	[-7.56]	[5.90]	[6.93]	[11.62]
Obs	15,724	18,533	10,868	15,724	18,533	10,868	15,724	18,533	10,868
Adj R^2	0.065	0.063	0.095	0.051	0.045	0.084	0.092	0.590	0.181
GovtHoldings	-0.89***	-0.90***	-0.26	-1.80***	-2.08***	0.09	2.45***	6.53***	0.00
	[-6.41]	[-7.79]	[-1.01]	[-5.76]	[-6.65]	[0.12]	[3.53]	[4.30]	[0.00]
EquitySize	0.17***	0.21***	0.35***	0.76***	0.78***	1.09***	-0.55**	-1.63***	-2.56***
	[5.68]	[6.83]	[9.13]	[10.96]	[11.70]	[8.24]	[-2.45]	[-4.27]	[-9.18]
Constant	-2.75***	-4.16***	-7.38***	-14.49***	-15.51***	-22.72***	28.56***	56.99***	81.09***
	[-3.83]	[-5.72]	[-9.52]	[-9.21]	[-9.43]	[-7.48]	[5.23]	[6.84]	[11.67]
Obs	15,724	18,533	10,868	15,724	18,533	10,868	15,724	18,533	10,868
Adj R^2	0.056	0.057	0.095	0.047	0.041	0.084	0.081	0.588	0.180

Conclusions

- Our paper provides the first comprehensive study on the price efficiency of China's credit market.
- We document the emerging importance of two factors in China's credit pricing:
  - Credit quality after the first default in 2014Q1.
  - Government support post 2018Q2.
- Overall, we find a market of improved price efficiency, and, paradoxically, worsening segmentation as government support emerges as an important factor in credit pricing.
- Along with the deepening allocational inefficiency, non-SOEs in China have lost their advantage in profitability and fundamental strength over SOEs.