# FinTech Adoption and Household Risk-Taking From Digital Payments to Platform Investments

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Based on joint work with Claire Yurong Hong (SJTU) and Xiaomeng Lu (Fudan)

From Digital Payments to Platform Investments

FinTech Adoption and Household Risk-Taking

# Household Finance in the Age of FinTech

- The current wave of "Fin + Tech" is unique in that:
  - FinTech **platforms** with giant user bases and high technological efficiency.
  - Financial services delivered directly via the convenience of **super apps**.
  - ► All-in-one ecosystems **bundling** digital payments with a wide range of products.

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- In China, activities central to household finance migrating onto FinTech platforms.
  - ▶ Consumption: online consumption accounts for 25% of the total.
  - Investments: 30% of mutual fund purchases.
  - Payments: digital payments everywhere.

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- Our paper: How widespread adoptions of FinTech can reshape household finance and enhance financial inclusion.
  - Can FinTech improve risk-taking by helping breakdown the traditional barriers faced by households in their participation of financial markets?
  - Who benefits the most from the financial inclusion via FinTech?

# Alipay: A FinTech App that Bundles "Everything"

Imagine if

- Main-Street Banks
- Wall Street's Brokers
- Boston's Asset Managers
- Onnecticut's Insurers

all shrunk to fit into

One Single App

that almost everyone used.

- The Economist, Oct 8th 2020



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- Reduction or even elimination of the physical costs of participation.
- Reduction of the psychological barriers:
  - Via FinTech adoptions, individuals acquire familiarity through repeated usages of digital payments on the all-in-one super-apps.
  - As familiarity leads to trust, repeated usages of digital payments can help lessen the psychological barriers that prevent households from market participation.

# A Unique Explosion of FinTech Penetration





"Use QR-Code Scan to pay at local farmer's markets."



# Summary of Main Findings

- County-level evidence:
  - ► One standard deviation increase in FinTech penetration predicts 0.8%~2.2% increases in risky-fund purchase over the next month.
  - Use Distance to Ant to capture the exogenous variation in FinTech penetration.
- Individual-level evidence:
  - One standard deviation increase in FinTech adoption predicts 1.4%~2.7% increases in risky fund purchase over the next month.
  - Systematic vs. idiosyncratic Fintech adoption.
  - Further evidences on risky share, portfolio volatility and portfolio diversification.
- Financial inclusion via FinTech: Who benefits more?
  - Individuals with higher risk tolerance (proxied by their consumption volatility).
  - Counties under-served by traditional banks (proxied by # of bank branches).

#### **Related Literature**

- Household finance and portfolio choices: Merton (1971) and Campbell (2006).
- Familiarity and trust as a driver of low participation and under risk-taking. Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2004) and Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008).
- Technology and household finance:
  - ▶ Platform investments in mutual funds: Hong, Lu, and Pan (2022).
  - Tech and household investments: Barber and Odean (2002), Choi, Laibson, and Metrick (2002), Bogan (2008), D'Acunto, Prabhala, and Rossi (2019), and Reher and Sokolinski (2021).
  - Digital payments, mobile money, and financial inclusion/liberation: Jack and Suri (2011), Agarwal et al. (2019), Suri, Bharadwaj, and Jack (2021), Ouyang (2021), Buchak, Hu, and Wei (2022).
- Consumption volatility and risk aversion: Mankiw and Zeldes (1991).

# Data Summary

#### A random sample of 50,000 individuals from Ant Group

- Monthly payments, consumption, and investments from Jan 2017 to Mar 2019.
- Risky mutual funds: Bond, Mixed, Equity, Index, QDII, and Gold.

Variable	Mean	Median	STD	Ν
Age	30.4	29.0	7.8	50,000
Female	0.6	1.0	0.5	50,000
Consumption (yuan)	2,155	1,259	17,064	50,000
Consumption $\sigma_{\rm C}$	1.01	0.73	0.92	50,000
QRPay (# per month)	21.40	15.70	19.22	50,000
AliFrac	0.54	0.56	0.22	50,000
Risky Purchase	9.2%	0.0%	28.9%	1,350,000
#Funds	3.71	2.00	5.85	28,393
#Assets	1.93	1.00	1.30	28,393
Risky Share	50.8%	51.1%	46.2%	28,393
Portfolio $\sigma_{\rm W}$	2.13%	0.18%	4.66%	28,393

- $\sigma_{\rm C}$ : Consumption growth volatility
- Risky Purchase: = 1 if purchase any risky fund in a month
- Risky Share: Fraction of risky investments out of total holdings
- $\sigma_{\rm W}$ : Portfolio return volatility

#### Measuring FinTech Penetration

- $QRPay_t^i$ : individual *i*'s number of Alipay payments during month *t*.
- City-level FinTech penetration:  $QRPay_t^i$  averaged across i in a given city.



• Calculate county-level variables as the individual average

$$\mathsf{Risky} \; \mathsf{Purchase}_{t+1}^c = a * \mathsf{Log}(\mathsf{QRPay})_t^c + \sum \mathsf{b*Controls}_t^c + \epsilon_t^c$$

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Log(QRPay)	2.190***	0.781***	1.057***	1.017***
	(5.57)	(4.34)	(4.85)	(4.59)
Log(GDP)	-0.596***	-0.147	-0.275**	-0.266**
	(-3.95)	(-1.30)	(-2.25)	(-2.15)
Log(Income)	0.236*	0.406***	0.155	0.162
	(1.97)	(3.78)	(1.25)	(1.30)
Log(Population)	-0.07	0.042	0.053	0.056
	(-0.78)	(0.47)	(0.53)	(0.56)
Fixed Effects		month	month&province	$month \times province$
Observations	20,852	20,852	20,852	20,852
R-squared	0.119	0.334	0.351	0.387

• One std increase in Log(QRPay)  $\Rightarrow$  Next-month increase of **0.8%** to **2.2%** in risky purchase.

Use "Distance to Ant" to capture the exogenous shocks to FinTech exposure:



	Y=Log(QRPay)					
	All	$\leqslant$ 1000 km	≼500 km	≼300 km		
Log(Dist to Ant) (a)	-0.268***	-0.184***	-0.140***	-0.167***		
	(-14.31)	(-6.55)	(-3.60)	(-4.01)		
Controls, Time FE	Y	Y	Y	Y		
Observations	20,852	12,402	5,902	4,212		
R-squared	72.8%	71.9%	71.4%	69.3%		
F-stat of (a)	204.80	42.91	12.94	16.05		
	All	$\leqslant$ 1000 km	≼500 km	≼300 km		
Log(Dist to SH) (b)	-0.237***	-0.133***	-0.048	-0.062		
	(-12.20)	(-4.58)	(-0.95)	(-1.03)		
Controls, Time FE	Y	Y	Ý	Ý		
Observations	20,852	12,402	5,902	4,212		
R-squared	71.5%	70.8%	70.1%	67.1%		
F-stat of (b)	148.82	20.99	0.91	1.06		

#### FinTech Adoption and Household Risk-Taking

Also take advantage of the time-varying FinTech penetration:



	First Stage			0	Second Sta	ge
	Y	=Log(QRPa	y)	Y=	Risky Puro	chase
Log(QRPay)				2.335** (2.11)	2.150** (2.09)	3.534*** (2.81)
Log(Dist to Ant)	-0.167*** (-4.01)	-0.230*** (-4.88)	-0.340*** (-5.56)	. ,	<b>、</b> ,	
Log(Dist to Ant)*Time	· · ·	0.071*** (8.04)	0.071*** (4.72)			
Controls	Y	Ύ	Ύ	Y	Y	Y
Time FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
City FE	Ν	Ν	Y	Ν	Ν	Y
Observations	4,212	4,212	4,212	4,212	4,212	4,212
R-squared	69.3%	69.4%	83.2%	38.7%	38.7%	42.8%

# Can FinTech Improve Household Risk-Taking? Individual-Level Evidence

Risky Purchase <sup><i>i</i></sup> <sub><i>t</i>+1</sub> = $a * Log(QRPay)^{i}_{t} +$	$\sum b*Controls_t^i + \epsilon_t^i$
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	Y=Risky Purchase								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	
Log(QRPay)	2.719*** (7.78)	2.206*** (8.13)	2.660*** (6.07)	1.413*** (6.32)					
Sys Log(QRPay)					3.387*** (8.15)	2.786*** (8.57)	4.811*** (5.74)	2.743*** (6.18)	
Idio Log(QRPay)					1.047* <sup>**</sup> * (5.00)	0.991*** (5.09)	1.058* <sup>**</sup> (5.04)	1.009*** (5.25)	
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Ύ	Ύ	Ύ	Ύ	
Time FE	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	
User FE	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	
Observations	1,300,000	1,300,000	1,300,000	1,300,000	1,299,844	1,299,844	1,299,844	1,299,844	
R-squared	1.2%	2.2%	28.4%	29.4%	1.3%	2.3%	28.6%	29.5%	

• Sys  $Log(QRPay)_t^i$ : Predicted part of  $Log(QRPay)_t^i$  that can be explained by same-county peers

• Idio  $Log(QRPay)_t^i$ : Idiosyncratic component of  $Log(QRPay)_t^i$  that cannot be explained by peers

# Can FinTech Improve Household Risk-Taking? Individual-Level Evidence

Risky Purchase
$$_{t+1}^{i} = a * \mathsf{Log}(\mathsf{QRPay})_{t}^{i} + \sum b * \mathsf{Controls}_{t}^{i} + \epsilon_{t}^{i}$$

	Y=Risky Purchase							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Log(QRPay)	2.719*** (7.78)	2.206*** (8.13)	2.660*** (6.07)	1.413*** (6.32)				
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Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Ŷ	Ý	Ý
Time FE	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
User FE	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
Observations	1,300,000	1,300,000	1,300,000	1,300,000	1,299,844	1,299,844	1,299,844	1,299,844
K-squared	1.2%	2.2%	28.4%	29.4%	1.3%	2.3%	28.6%	29.5%

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#### Financial Inclusion via FinTech — Individuals with Higher Risk Tolerance

Is risk-taking improvement stronger for more risk-tolerant individuals?

- Age (young) and gender (male) (e.g., Barber and Odean, 2002)
- Proxy individuals' risk tolerance by their consumption volatility  $\sigma_{\rm C}$  (Merton, 1971).

$$\sigma_{\mathsf{C}} = \sigma_{\mathsf{W}} = \mathsf{risky} \; \mathsf{share} \times \sigma_R = rac{1}{\gamma} \, rac{\mu - r}{\sigma_R}$$

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		$Y = \sigma_W$	
Log(QRPay)	0.261***	0.263***	0.383***
	(9.46)	(9.49)	(7.87)
$Log(QRPay)*\sigma_C$		0.083***	0.079***
- , -, -		(2.82)	(2.67)
Log(QRPay)*Log(C)			-0.007
L = #(OPD=)*E=====			(-0.29)
Log(QRPay)*Female			(-2.98)
Log(QRPay)*Log(Age)			-0.092***
Controls	Y	Y	Y
Observations	28,393	28,393	28,393
R-squared	1.7%	1.7%	1.8%

#### FinTech Adoption and Household Risk-Taking

#### Financial Inclusion via FinTech — Counties Under-Served by Banks

	$Y=Risky Purchase_{t+1}$				
	(1)	(2)	(3)		
Log(QRPay)	2.154***	2.134***	0.875***		
	(5.31)	(5.15)	(3.78)		
Log(QRPay)*LowBank	0.364**	0.410**	0.427**		
	(2.09)	(2.30)	(2.11)		
Log(QRPay)*Log(GDP)		-0.005	0.024		
		(-0.06)	(0.24)		
Log(QRPay)*Log(Income)		0.049	0.269**		
		(0.55)	(2.61)		
Log(QRPay)*Log(Population)		0.085	0.087		
		(1.23)	(1.13)		
Controls	Y	Y	Y		
Province*Time FE	N	Ν	Y		
Observations	20,202	20,202	20,176		
R-squared	13.3%	13.4%	40.1%		

### Financial Inclusion via FinTech — Counties Under-Served by Banks

Is risk-taking improvement stronger for counties under-served by financial institutions?

- Proxy financial-service coverage by number of county-level bank branches
- Matched individual sample: match each low-coverage county individual with a high-coverage county individual, by age, gender, consumption, and consumption volatility

Effect of FinTech on $\sigma_{W}$ : Coefficients on Log(QRPay)									
	Low Bank	High Bank	Difference		Low Bank	High Bank	Difference		
All	0.505*** (5.26)	0.245*** (2.82)	0.260** (2.01)						
High Risk Tolerance ( $\sigma_{\sf C}$ )	0.701*** (4.60)	0.359*** (3.02)	0.342* (1.78)	Low Risk Tolerance ( $\sigma_{\rm C}$ )	0.339*** (2.86)	0.122 (0.96)	0.217 (1.25)		
Age [30,55]	0.486*** (4.37)	0.077 (0.73)	0.409*** (2.66)	Age<30 or Age>55	0.529*** (3.22)	0.467*** (3.26)	0.062 (0.28)		
High Consumption $(C)$	0.651*** (4.69)	0.176 (1.43)	0.475** (2.57)	Low Consumption $(C)$	0.356*** (2.68)	0.305** (2.48)	0.05 (0.28)		

Monthly Fund Alpha, 2019.4-2021.12									
			VW			EW			
		All Funds	Ant Funds	Ant Investor Held	All Funds	Ant Funds	Ant Investor Held		
Bond	Mean	0.02%	0.04%	0.05%	0.01%	0.02%	0.02%		
	t-stat	(0.88)	(1.05)	(0.74)	(0.20)	(0.27)	(0.36)		
Mixed	Mean	1.00%*	1.04%*	1.18%*	0.97%**	1.03%	1.23%*		
	t-stat	(1.72)	(1.72)	(1.91)	(2.08)	(2.05)	(2.02)		
Equity	Mean	0.46%	0.80%	1.00%*	0.60%	0.72%	0.78%		
	t-stat	(1.01)	(1.41)	(1.83)	(1.35)	(1.50)	(1.58)		

#### **Diversification Benefits**

	Log(#Funds)	Log(#Assets)	Variance Reduction	Sharpe Ratio
Log(QRPay)	0.106***	0.067***	1.432***	0.955***
- • • • •	(19.46)	(17.96)	(14.91)	(11.87)
Log(Age)	-0.068***	-0.052***	-0.782***	-0.640***
	(-12.96)	(-14.78)	(-9.49)	(-10.38)
Female	-0.155***	-0.109***	-1.347***	-1.393***
	(-15.89)	(-17.86)	(-7.17)	(-11.20)
Log(C)	0.001	-0.006**	-0.159**	0.068
	(0.30)	(-2.28)	(-2.20)	(1.19)
$\sigma_{C}$	0.019***	0.010***	0.156**	0.082
	(3.92)	(3.15)	(2.19)	(1.39)
Constant	1.494***	1.111***	5.662***	11.690***
	(161.27)	(173.01)	(28.26)	(81.77)
Observations	20,033	20,033	20,033	20,033
R-squared	6.2%	7.1%	3.3%	3.4%

### Conclusions

- We study Household Finance in the age of FinTech and find that
  - FinTech penetration improves risk-taking, more for risk-tolerant individuals.
  - Counties with low banking coverage benefit more from FinTech penetration.
- Interpretations of our findings:
  - ► FinTech convenience reduces physical costs, increasing participation.
  - By bundling digital payments together with financial products, FinTech platforms help reduce the psychological barriers to risk-taking, as repeated usages of super apps build familiarity and trust.
- Future of FinTech:
  - Brighter for emerging economies lacking financial infrastructures.
  - From Tech to Fin, more content building.