

Class 17: Corporate Bonds and Credit Pricing

Financial Markets, Fall 2020, SAIF

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- Corporate Bonds:
 - ▶ Default Intensity.
 - ▶ Loss Given Default.
- Modeling Default:
 - ▶ Structural Approach.
 - ▶ Reduced-Form Approach .
- Credit Default Swaps.

- Key Risk Factors
 - ▶ Yield curve uncertainties: **Level**, **Slope**, and interest rate **Volatility**.
 - ▶ **Counterparty risk** in OTC derivatives.
 - ▶ **Credit risk** in corporate bonds, CDS, bank loans, mortgages, muni's, commercial paper, CDO/CLO.
 - ▶ **Liquidity risk**, often coupled with credit events.
 - ▶ **Optionalities**: callable and puttable bonds, prepayment in MBS, etc.
- Measures of Risk:
 - ▶ **Term Spreads**: long-term yield minus short-term yield.
 - ▶ **Volatility**: swaption implied vol.
 - ▶ **Credit/Liquidity Spreads**: LIBOR-Treasury, LIBOR-OIS, Swap-Treasury, Old Bond/New Bond, Corp Spread, CDS, etc.



Outstanding US Bond Market Debt (USD Billions)

| | Municipal | Treasury | Mortgage Related | Corporate Debt | Federal Agency Securities | Money Markets | Asset-Backed | Total |
|-------------|-----------|----------|---------------------|-------------------|---------------------------------|------------------|--------------|----------|
| 2004 | 2,876.1 | 3,945.8 | 6,301.7 | 4,563.4 | 2,700.6 | 1,399.1 | 1,100.2 | 22,887.0 |
| 2005 | 3,098.9 | 4,170.0 | 7,218.1 | 4,637.5 | 2,616.0 | 1,644.2 | 1,281.4 | 24,666.0 |
| 2006 | 3,284.7 | 4,328.0 | 8,389.9 | 4,883.5 | 2,634.0 | 1,958.4 | 1,656.9 | 27,135.3 |
| 2007 | 3,549.8 | 4,522.6 | 9,386.0 | 5,322.1 | 2,906.2 | 1,788.9 | 1,963.5 | 29,439.1 |
| 2008 | 3,665.9 | 5,783.6 | 9,467.4 | 5,500.0 | 3,210.6 | 1,599.8 | 1,829.5 | 31,056.9 |
| 2009 | 3,850.3 | 7,260.6 | 9,352.5 | 6,090.3 | 2,727.5 | 1,138.0 | 1,712.1 | 32,131.3 |
| 2010 | 3,967.3 | 8,853.0 | 9,258.4 | 6,726.9 | 2,538.8 | 1,057.6 | 1,507.8 | 33,909.8 |
| 2011 | 3,930.2 | 9,928.4 | 9,075.5 | 6,840.5 | 2,326.9 | 969.3 | 1,359.0 | 34,429.8 |
| 2012 | 3,931.6 | 11,046.1 | 8,838.1 | 7,249.6 | 2,095.8 | 952.3 | 1,280.3 | 35,393.9 |
| 2013 | 3,866.4 | 11,854.4 | 8,742.6 | 7,674.7 | 2,056.9 | 951.6 | 1,285.7 | 36,432.3 |
| 2014 | 3,822.1 | 12,504.8 | 8,842.0 | 8,040.7 | 2,028.7 | 930.4 | 1,349.4 | 37,518.2 |
| 2015 | 3,838.4 | 13,191.6 | 8,894.8 | 8,272.8 | 1,995.4 | 941.5 | 1,376.6 | 38,511.0 |
| 2016 | 3,885.0 | 13,908.2 | 9,023.4 | 8,675.9 | 1,971.7 | 884.9 | 1,391.8 | 39,740.8 |
| 2017 | 3,899.3 | 14,468.8 | 9,304.5 | 8,996.8 | 1,934.7 | 965.9 | 1,457.9 | 41,027.9 |
| 2018 | 3,842.1 | 15,608.0 | 9,732.3 | 9,231.5 | 1,841.6 | 996.0 | 1,615.6 | 42,867.0 |
| 2019 | 3,862.2 | 16,673.3 | 10,307.6 | 9,566.4 | 1,726.2 | 1,045.2 | 1,677.6 | 44,858.5 |
| <u>2020</u> | | | | | | | | |
| Q1 | 3,867.8 | 17,154.0 | 10,294.4 | 9,869.8 | 2,049.1 | 1,088.8 | 1,754.7 | 46,078.6 |
| Q2 | 3,887.6 | 19,898.7 | 10,698.7 | 10,414.5 | 1,834.2 | 1,006.6 | 1,808.4 | 49,548.7 |
| Q3 | 3,922.7 | 20,367.7 | 10,906.9 | 10,439.4 | 1,765.5 | 956.9 | 1,777.3 | 50,136.4 |



Average Daily Trading Volume (USD Billions)

| | Municipal | Treasury | Agency MBS | Non-Agency MBS | ABS | Corporate Debt | Federal Agency Securities |
|-------------|-----------|----------|------------|----------------|-----|----------------|---------------------------|
| 2004 | 14.8 | 499.0 | 207.4 | - | - | 17.3 | 78.8 |
| 2005 | 16.9 | 554.5 | 251.8 | - | - | 16.6 | 78.8 |
| 2006 | 23.1 | 524.7 | 254.6 | - | - | 16.9 | 74.4 |
| 2007 | 25.1 | 570.2 | 320.1 | - | - | 16.4 | 83.0 |
| 2008 | 19.4 | 553.1 | 344.9 | - | - | 14.3 | 104.5 |
| 2009 | 12.5 | 407.9 | 299.9 | - | - | 19.9 | 77.7 |
| 2010 | 13.3 | 528.2 | 320.6 | - | - | 20.5 | 11.2 |
| 2011 | 11.3 | 567.8 | 243.3 | 4.4 | 1.5 | 20.6 | 9.6 |
| 2012 | 11.3 | 518.9 | 280.4 | 4.5 | 1.5 | 22.6 | 9.7 |
| 2013 | 11.2 | 545.4 | 222.8 | 4.1 | 1.3 | 24.7 | 6.6 |
| 2014 | 9.9 | 505.0 | 178.0 | 3.7 | 1.5 | 26.7 | 5.3 |
| 2015 | 8.6 | 490.0 | 193.0 | 3.1 | 1.4 | 27.9 | 4.5 |
| 2016 | 10.6 | 519.1 | 206.6 | 2.9 | 1.3 | 29.6 | 5.4 |
| 2017 | 10.8 | 505.2 | 209.1 | 2.5 | 1.4 | 30.6 | 4.1 |
| 2018 | 11.6 | 547.8 | 218.1 | 2.4 | 1.4 | 31.2 | 3.5 |
| 2019 | 11.5 | 593.6 | 247.6 | 2.7 | 1.5 | 33.9 | 4.1 |
| <u>2020</u> | | | | | | | |
| Jan | 12.0 | 531.2 | 300.7 | 3.4 | 1.9 | 39.0 | 4.8 |
| Feb | 12.6 | 649.5 | 321.3 | 2.8 | 1.9 | 40.4 | 4.7 |
| Mar | 23.4 | 915.5 | 332.5 | 6.5 | 3.6 | 49.9 | 6.8 |
| Apr | 13.3 | 721.9 | 278.4 | 3.9 | 2.0 | 48.9 | 6.9 |
| May | 11.7 | 627.8 | 268.3 | 3.3 | 1.8 | 46.3 | 5.4 |
| Jun | 11.1 | 626.4 | 248.4 | 3.1 | 2.0 | 43.0 | 5.9 |
| Jul | 11.1 | 492.5 | 276.4 | 2.8 | 1.6 | 32.7 | 5.8 |
| Aug | 9.6 | 517.0 | 293.7 | 2.4 | 1.7 | 31.1 | 5.1 |
| Sep | 10.4 | 554.6 | 281.9 | 2.4 | 1.6 | 34.5 | 4.7 |
| Oct | 11.4 | 498.8 | 299.5 | 2.7 | 1.6 | 34.6 | 4.3 |
| Nov | 7.9 | 624.6 | 307.7 | 2.1 | 1.6 | 38.3 | 3.8 |



Credit Spreads



One-Year Default Rates



Credit Spreads and Default Rates



Defaults in 2008, by Industry Distribution

| Broad Industry | Percent of Issuer Counts | Percent of Dollar Volume |
|-----------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| Banking | 8.9% | 25.4% |
| Capital industries | 29.7% | 5.2% |
| Consumer Industries | 22.8% | 5.1% |
| Energy & Environment | 6.9% | 2.0% |
| FIRE | 9.9% | 53.8% |
| Media & Publishing | 8.9% | 6.7% |
| Retail & Distribution | 4.0% | 0.7% |
| Technology | 5.0% | 0.8% |
| Transportation | 4.0% | 0.4% |
| Utilities | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| 2008 Total | 101 | \$281.2 bil |

- Lehman was the largest default in history: \$120.2B.
- 84 of the 101 defaulters were in North American with 74 in the US.
- North American defaulted debt volumes: \$226.2B.

Defaults in 2008 by Financial Institutions

Senior Unsecured Bond Recovery Rates for Financial Institution Defaults in 2008¹

| Company | Domain | Default Volume (\$M) | Sr. Unsecured Bond Recovery |
|---------------------------------|---------------|----------------------|-----------------------------|
| Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. | United States | 120,164 | 9.3% |
| Kaupthing Bank hf | Iceland | 20,063 | 4.0% |
| Glitnir banki hf | Iceland | 18,773 | 3.0% |
| GMAC LLC | United States | 17,190 | 69.9% |
| Washington Mutual Bank | United States | 13,600 | 26.5% |
| Residential Capital, LLC | United States | 12,315 | 51.7% |
| Landsbanki Islands hf | Iceland | 12,161 | 3.0% |
| Washington Mutual, Inc. | United States | 5,746 | 57.0% |
| GMAC of Canada Ltd | Canada | 265 | 70.7% |
| Downey Financial Corp. | United States | 200 | 0.5% |
| Fremont General Corporation | United States | 166 | 46.0% |
| Luminent Mortgage Capital, Inc. | United States | 131 | 27.3% |
| Triad Financial Corporation | United States | 89 | 76.5% |
| Franklin Bank Corp. | United States | 80 | 0.0% |
| GMAC International Finance B.V. | Netherlands | 51 | 85.5% |
| Average | 35.4% | Median | 27.3% |

1. Based on 30-day post-default market prices.

Recovery Rates

Recovery Rates based on debt trading prices 30 days after the default date

EXHIBIT 7

Average corporate debt recovery rates measured by post-default trading prices

| Lien Position | Issuer-weighted | | | Volume-weighted | | |
|-------------------------|-----------------|-------|-----------|-----------------|-------|-----------|
| | 2014 | 2013 | 1982-2014 | 2014 | 2013 | 1982-2014 |
| 1st Lien Bank Loan | 78.4% | 75.1% | 66.6% | 80.6% | 67.7% | 62.5% |
| 2nd Lien Bank Loan* | 10.5% | 78.7% | 31.8% | 10.5% | 69.2% | 28.5% |
| Sr. Unsecured Bank Loan | n.a. | n.a. | 47.1% | n.a. | n.a. | 40.2% |
| Sr. Secured Bond | 59.5% | 59.8% | 52.8% | 76.5% | 59.5% | 52.4% |
| Sr. Unsecured Bond | 43.3% | 43.8% | 37.4% | 34.3% | 29.2% | 33.6% |
| Sr. Subordinated Bond* | 46.9% | 20.7% | 31.1% | 28.3% | 26.6% | 26.0% |
| Subordinated Bond** | 38.8% | 26.4% | 31.4% | 38.0% | 33.7% | 26.3% |
| Jr. Subordinated Bond | n.a. | n.a. | 24.7% | n.a. | n.a. | 17.1% |

* The average recovery rates for 2014's and 2013's second lien bank loans and senior subordinated bonds were each based on fewer than five defaults.

** The average recovery rates for 2014's subordinated bonds were based on fewer than five defaults.

Recovery Rates based on ultimate recoveries

EXHIBIT 8

Average corporate debt recovery rates measured by ultimate recoveries, 1987-2014

| Lien Position | Emergence Year | | | Default Year | | |
|---------------------------|----------------|-------|-----------|--------------|-------|-----------|
| | 2014 | 2013 | 1987-2014 | 2014 | 2013 | 1987-2014 |
| Loans* | 81.0% | 76.7% | 80.2% | 68.4% | 76.6% | 80.2% |
| Senior Secured Bonds** | 57.1% | 84.2% | 63.0% | 59.4% | 56.9% | 63.0% |
| Senior Unsecured Bonds*** | 44.6% | 61.3% | 48.8% | 0.0% | 34.4% | 48.8% |
| Subordinated Bonds | 0.0% | 21.0% | 28.2% | 0.0% | 21.0% | 28.2% |


Various Sources to Estimate Default Probability

- We will now focus on modeling and estimating the default probability, while keeping the recovery rate, which is 1 minus the loss rate, at a constant level.
- Information about default probability can be collected from:
 - ▶ **Rating:** credit ratings (S&P, Moody's, Fitch) and the historical default rates by rating category.
 - ▶ **Equity Market:** firm fundamentals, financial statements and equity-market information (Moody's KMV).
 - ▶ **Credit Market:** the market prices of securities with exposure to default risk: corporate bond yield spreads or credit-default swap (CDS) spreads.

Modeling Default

- Structural Models: focus on the firm's fundamentals (enterprise values or earnings).
- Reduced-Form Models: treat default as the outcome of a Poisson process.
- The main outputs of defaultable models: term structure of default probabilities.
- When defaultable securities are pooled together, then the valuation involves crucially on the model-implied probability of correlated default.

Model Default using Structural Approach (Merton 1974)




Distance to Default and Probability of Default

$$DD = \frac{\ln(V/K) + (\mu - \sigma_A^2/2) t}{\sigma_A \sqrt{t}}$$

- The market value of assets V
- Asset volatility σ_A
- The book value of liabilities K
- Debt-to-Asset ratio: K/V
- The expected growth rate of asset value μ
- t = the time horizon
- DD = distance to default = number of std the firm is away from default

Default Probability = $N(-DD)$




Key Determinants of the Distance to Default

$$DD = \frac{(\mu - \sigma_A^2/2) t - \ln(K/V)}{\sigma_A \sqrt{t}}$$

| debt ratio K/V | asset growth μ | asset vol σ_A | horizon t | distance to default DD |
|---------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|----------------|---------------------------|
| 15% | 10% | 40% | 1yr | 4.79 |
| 15% | 10% | 20% | 1yr | 9.89 |
| 15% | 20% | 40% | 1yr | 5.04 |
| 50% | 10% | 40% | 1yr | 1.78 |
| 15% | 10% | 40% | 10yr | 1.66 |
| 15% | 10% | 20% | 10yr | 4.26 |

Moody KMV's Expected Default Frequency

- Probabilities implied by the normal distribution: too low.
- Moody's KMV: use actual default experiences to map DD to EDF.
- This procedure requires a large database of actual defaults.




Modeling Default using Reduced-Form Approach

- Let \tilde{T} be the random default time.
- The probability of survival up to time t :

$$\text{Prob} \left(\tilde{T} \geq t \right)$$

- The probability of default before time t :

$$\text{Prob} \left(\tilde{T} < t \right) = 1 - \text{Prob} \left(\tilde{T} \geq t \right)$$



Pricing a Zero-Coupon Bond

- Assume the constant default intensity λ of a firm is 100 bps.
- **The one-year default probability:** $1 - e^{-\lambda} \approx \lambda$.
- Assume zero recovery (100% loss given default):
 - ▶ Consider a one-year zero-coupon bond with \$1 face value:


$$P = e^{-r} \text{Prob}(\tilde{T} > 1) = e^{-r} \times e^{-\lambda} = e^{-(r+\lambda)}$$

- ▶ The yield to maturity of the defaultable bond: $r + \lambda$
 - ▶ **The credit spread of the defaultable bond:** λ
- Assume constant loss given default (L):



$$\begin{aligned} P &= e^{-r} \text{Prob}(\tilde{T} > 1) + e^{-r} \text{Prob}(\tilde{T} \leq 1) \times (1 - L) \\ &= e^{-r} \times e^{-\lambda} + e^{-r} \times (1 - e^{-\lambda}) \times (1 - L) \end{aligned}$$

For small λ , the credit spread is approximately: $\lambda \times L$.

Credit Spreads and Business Cycle





Credit Spreads and Default Rates



Credit Default Swaps

- The US corporate bond market is among the most illiquid markets. For a market of \$8T in 2015, the average daily trading volume is only \$25B. By comparison, the average daily volume is \$499B for US Treasury and \$321B for US Equity.
- In buying a corporate bond, investors take on both duration and credit exposures. To have a pure positive exposure to credit risk, investors have to hedge out the duration risk. To have a pure negative exposure to credit risk, investors have to locate, borrow, and then sell the bonds and buy back the duration exposure.
- The emergence of credit derivatives was in part a response to the limitations of corporate bonds as a vehicle for credit risk.

CDS and Interest Rate Swaps



Valuation: One-Year Credit Default Swap

- Consider a one-year CDS and assume constant interest rate r .
 - ▶ The present value of the annuity:

$$\text{CDS} \times P(\tilde{T} > 1) \times e^{-r}$$

- ▶ The present value of the insurance:

$$\text{Loss} \times P(\tilde{T} \leq 1) \times e^{-r}$$

- Set CDS so that the two legs have the same present value:

$$\text{CDS} = \frac{P(\tilde{T} \leq 1) \times \text{Loss}}{1 - P(\tilde{T} \leq 1)}$$

- **For small $P(\tilde{T} \leq 1)$, CDS \approx “1yr Default Probability” \times “Loss”**

Applying Constant Default Intensity Model

- Let's use the constant default intensity model:


$$\text{one-year default probability} = 1 - e^{-\lambda}$$

- The one-year CDS price is


$$\text{CDS} = \frac{(1 - e^{-\lambda}) \times \text{Loss}}{e^{-\lambda}} \approx \lambda \times \text{Loss},$$

where the approximation works well for small λ .

CDS on Ford Motors



CDS on Banks




CDS on Sovereign Bonds



5YR CDS, China and US



CDS-Bond Basis



Source: J.P. Morgan.